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Abstract 
The EPSRC principles of robotics make a number of commitments about the 
ontological status of robots such as that robots are Òjust toolsÓ or can give only 
Òan impression or real intelligenceÓ.  This commentary proposes that this 
assumes, all too easily, that we know the boundary conditions of future robotics 
development, and argues that progress towards a more useful set of principles 
could begin by thinking carefully about the ontological status of robots. Whilst 
most robots are currently little more than tools, we are entering an era where 
there will be new kinds of entities that combine some of the properties of tools 
with psychological capacities that we had previously thought were reserved for 
complex biological organisms such as humans. The ontological status of robots 
might be best described as liminalÑneither living nor simply mechanical. There 
is also evidence that people will treat robots as more than just tools regardless of 
the extent to which their machine nature is transparent. Ethical principles need to 
be developed that recognize these ontological and psychological issues around 
the nature of robots and how they are perceived. 
Keywords: robot ethics; principles of robotics; ontological status of robots; 
perceptions of robots; machine intelligence. 
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At the heart of the EPSRC principles of robotics (henceforth Ôthe principlesÕ) are a 
number of ontological claims
1
 about the nature of robots that serve as axioms to frame 
the subsequent development of ethical challenges and rules.  These include claims about 
what robots are, and also about what they are not.   The claims about what robots are 
include that Òrobots are multi-use toolsÓ (principle 1) or Òjust toolsÓ (commentary on 
principle 2), that Òrobots are productsÓ (principle 3) and Òpieces of technologyÓ 
(commentary on principle 3), and that Òrobots are manufactured artefactsÓ (principle 4). 
The claims about what robots are not include that Òhumans, not robots, are responsible 
agentsÓ (principle 2), that robots are Òsimply not peopleÓ (commentary on principle 3), 
and that robot intelligence can give only an Òimpression of real intelligenceÓ 
(commentary on principle 4). 
On first reading these statements seem straightforward assertions of obvious truths. I 
will argue that this is not the case.   Instead, I will propose that these ontological 
commitments lack nuance, they assume all too easily that we know the boundary 
conditions of future robotics development, and they obscure or ignore some of the 
important ethical debates.  If this is at all true, then progress towards a more useful set 
of principles could begin by thinking carefully about the ontological status of robots. 
If we look at how the principles are presented, there seems to be an implicit process of 
induction at work that allows statements about what most current robots are, to be re-
interpreted as statements about what robots must essentially be.  For example the 
statement that robots as multi-use tools in principle 1, slips into the claim that robots are 
Òjust tools designed to achieve goals and desires that humans specifyÓ in the 
commentary on principle 2 and to the statement that Òrobots are simply tools of various 
kinds, albeit very special toolsÓ in the preamble.   Whilst it is easy to agree with a 
general statement that robots are multi-use tools, especially in the context of a 
discussion about dual use (principle 1), the much stronger claim that robots are just 
tools, or simply tools, denies that they could sensibly belong to other disjoint categories.    
Take the category of  ÔcompanionÕ for instance.   There is a major effort around 
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 I treat these as ontological claims since the language used is descriptive (ÒareÓ, Òare notÓ) 
rather than prescriptive (Òshould beÓ, Òshould not beÓ).  There are a good number of 
prescriptive statements in the principles (particularly about what robot designers should do) 
whose rationale builds on these ontological statements about what robots are. 
developing robot companions that can provide social and emotional support to people as 
partially acknowledged in the discussion of principle 4.  The category of tools describes 
physical/mechanical objects that serve a function, whereas the category of companions 
describes significant others, usually people or animals, with whom you might have a 
reciprocal relationship marked by an emotional bond.   The possibility that robots could 
belong to both these categories raises important and interesting issues that are obscured 
by insisting that robots are just tools.    
Indeed, consistent with the view of robots as tools, the discussion of robot 
companionship in the principles is quite dismissive, describing them as toys that could 
afford some pleasure to people who are unable to, or cannot afford to, keep animal pets.  
Robots are faux companions on this account that create an Òillusion of emotionsÓ and 
their intelligence is artificial and not ÒrealÓ.  The faux nature of robot companions, it is 
argued, creates a real ethical problem in that robot companions are potentially 
deceptive
2
 and so should be designed so that their Òmachine nature is transparentÓ. 
The ontological problem here particularly concerns the claim that robots could never 
possess psychological capacities such as ÒrealÓ emotions or intelligence.  What these 
are, in human terms, is hotly debated in the cognitive and brain sciences. There is 
therefore no a priori reason to suppose that these capacities must be unique to humans 
and could not be shared by machines.  Indeed, there are counter-claims that robots, 
suitably configured, can have emotions (Fellous, 2004), whilst the future of artificial 
intelligence, as intelligence, has no obvious ceiling at below-human level. In other 
words, the distinction that the principles seeks to make between real and artificial 
psychological capacities may prove to be baseless over time.  
A further problem concerns the assumption about how people will see robotsÑ
specifically, that robots will be seen as tools if they are shown in a transparent way.  
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 Principle 4 states Ò[robots] should not be designed in a deceptive way to exploit vulnerable 
usersÓ.  But what counts as deceptive design?  According to Sparrow and Sparrow (2006), 
for instance, any use of robots in a social setting (i.e. as a ÒcompanionÓ) is deceptive, since, 
by their view, robots can never be genuine social actors.  Principle 4 could therefore be used 
to argue that robot companions are by their very nature unethical (at least, in the context of 
vulnerable users).  The commentary on principle 4 suggests a weaker interpretation, 
nevertheless, what this illustrates is that ontological claims about the extent to which 
artificial capabilities are real or not could have substantive ethical implications.  
 
This could easily be wrong, for instance, people may anthropomorphise robots 
regardless of how obviously they are manufactured products.  One reason to think this 
could be the case is the strongly social nature of our brains, and how easily our empathy 
is triggered by something that appears life-like.  The Heider and Simmel (1944) 
animations of simple geometric figures
 
(see fig. 1), show just how crude this 
information can be and yet we will still see intentionality, motivation, even emotion.   
Similarly, the invention of the Tamagotchi digital pet demonstrated that a simple 2-d 
animation of an animal-like creature can create a compelling urge to care (Levy, 2007).   
 
 
Figure 1. Geometric shapes moving around in a simple animation were interpreted has 
Òanimated beings, chiefly personsÓ, in this famous 1944 study by Heider and Simmel. 
The situation is further complicated by the fact that people can simultaneously hold 
multiple attitudes towards an entity such as a robot as characterised by DennettÕs three 
ÒstancesÓ (Dennett, 1987): the physical stance which views an entity as subject to 
physical laws such as gravity, the design stance which views a manufactured entity as 
acting according to purposes for which it was made, and the intentional stance which 
views a behaving entity as acting according to an internal set of beliefs and goals.   
Robbins and Jack (2006) added to these three levels a phenomenal stance that attributes 
consciousness and inner experience.  There is some evidence that people will more 
readily see robots as having intentional states compared to phenomenal states (Huebner, 
2010), suggesting a sophistication in our attitudes to robots that recognises them as 
more than machine but also less than human.   This richness and complexity in how 
people will perceive robots needs to be given greater consideration in discussions of 
robots as deceptive devices and in proposals for greater machine transparency in robot 
design.  It is clearly possible to view Heider and SimmelÕs animation from an 
intentional stance, or even a phenomenal stance, and not be deceived as to its real 
cartoon nature.  Indeed, watching their animation invokes a Òsuspension of disbeliefÓ, 
just as when you are watching a movie or a play, that allows you to emotionally engage 
with the animation as an unfolding social narrative whilst also seeing it for what it is as 
a sequence of moving geometric shapes. Similarly, we do not need to believe (or be 
deceived) that the psychological states, intentional or phenomenological, that we read 
into an artefact, such as robot, are akin to our own in order to experience an authentic 
and meaningful emotional response
3
.   
A systematic analysis of ontological and psychological issues in human-robot 
interaction has previously been made by Kahn and colleagues (2007).   Following a 
similar approach, we can describe four general ways in which ontological perspectives 
on what robots are, and psychological perspectives on how robots are seen, could 
combine. These are illustrated in the following table along with some of the ethical 
issues they entail.  
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 For further discussion of philosophical and ethical issues around the experience of emotions 
towards companions robots, and their similarity to emotions felt towards fictional entities, 
see Rodogno (2016). 
I.	Robots	are	just	tools	(o),	and	people	will	see	
robots	as	just	tools	unless	misled	by	deceptive	
robot	design	(p).		
Ethical	issues:	We	should	address	human	
responsibilities	as	robot	makers/users	and	the	
risk	of	deception	in	making	robots	that	appear	
to	be	something	they	are	not.		This	is	the	
position	of		‘the	principles’.			
II.	Robots	are	just	tools	(o),	but	people	may	
see	them	as	having	significant	psychological	
capacities	irrespective	of	the	transparency	of	
their	machine-nature	(p).		
Ethical	issues:	We	should	take	into	account	
how	people	see	robots,	for	instance,	that	they	
may	feel	themselves	as	having	meaningful	
and	valuable	relationships	with	robots,	or	
they	may	see	robots	as	having	important	
internal	states,	such	as	the	capacity	to	suffer,	
despite	them	not	having	such	capacities.	
III.	Robots	can	have	some	significant	
psychological	capacities	(o)	but	people	will	still	
see	them	as	just	tools	(p).		
Ethical	issues:	We	should	analyse	the	risks	of	
treating	entities	that	may	have	significant	
psychological	capacities,	such	as	the	ability	to	
suffer,	as	though	they	are	just	tools,	and	the	
dangers	inherent	in	creating	a	new	class	of	
entities	with	significant	psychological	
capacities,	such	as	human-like	intelligence,	
without	recognising	that	we	are	doing	so.	
IV.		Robots	can	have	some	significant	human-
like	psychological	capacities	(o),	and	people	
will	see	them	as	having	such	capacities	(p).		
Ethical	issues:	We	should	consider	scenarios	
in	which	people	will	need	to	co-exist	
alongside	new	kinds	of	psychologically	
significant	entities	in	the	form	of	future	
robots/AIs.			
 
Table 1. How ontological (o) and psychological (p) perspectives on robots can combine 
(after Kahn et al., 2007). Note that only one quadrant of this table (I) is addressed in the 
EPSRC principles, but that II, III and IV are all possible, at least theoretically.   
  
To conclude this essay I want to briefly consider some of the ethical issues that arise in 
quadrants IIÐIV.  
In quadrant II, interesting questions arise about how robots should be treatedÑnot 
because they are sentient agents but because people will choose to treat them as such.  
For instance, the idea that it should be unlawful to wilfully damage robots, proposed as 
part of the South Korean ÒRobot Ethics CharterÓ (Lovgren, 2007), or that we might 
mourn the loss of a favourite robot, as has been reported for some Japanese owners of 
Sony Aibo robot dogs (Brown, 2015), does not seem so strange when viewed from the 
perspective of how robots are seen by people rather than in terms of what they are.  Of 
course, appearance and function do matter, but transparency of Òmachine natureÓ will 
only be one factor of many influencing how people see and behave towards robots, and 
it may be nave to assume that it will be a decisive one.   The bonds people will form 
with some robots may be similar to those we develop with other valued possessions, 
such as cars and mobile phones. On the other hand, for some robots, they may be more 
like the relationships we have pet animals, including for instance, wishing to support 
and nurture them (something that we may ourselves find rewarding). Finally, some 
human-robot relationships may share similarities to human-human relationships.  For 
instance, I may develop a bond with my companion robot not because it looks human 
but because it has the capacity to remember and communicate with me about some of 
our shared experiences.   More generally, what may be needed, in order to develop 
suitable ethical principles, is to develop a taxonomy of the different forms of emotional 
bonds that could exist between robots and people and analyse the factors that could 
underpin the development and maintenance of such relationships (Collins, Millings, & 
Prescott, 2013). 
Quadrant III concerns the possibility of robots having significant psychological 
capacities that are in danger of being over-looked by people.  This raises the potential 
for ethical risks
4
 that are not discussed in the principles, but that have been highlighted 
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 To have any specific psychological capacity does not necessary imply any specific moral 
consequence.  On the other hand, psychological capacities are at the core of many views of 
morality. For instance, having the ability to suffer has very significant moral implications for 
most people and comes up repeatedly in debates about, for instance, animal rights.  Similarly 
the presence of consciousness is widely seen as an important consideration for ethical 
debates about the treatment of patients in coma or with locked-in syndrome. 
 
by others.  For instance, Metzinger (2009) has argued that we could build robots that are 
capable of experiencing suffering without realising that we are doing so, and therefore 
create a new kind of sentient entity that suffers unnecessarily due to our actions; many 
people would see this as ethically problematic if it were to happen.   Although this may 
seem unlikely in the near-term, there are grounds to consider that this could be a risk in 
the medium- to long-term as cognitive architectures for robots become more 
sophisticated.  Several trends in on-going research on human consciousness also support 
this possibility.  First, one of the major contemporary theories of consciousness 
(Tononi, 2008) asserts a critical role for integration of information that does not  
necessarily require a biological substrate. Neurologists are also re-appraising whether 
islands of integrated activity in the brains of Ôlocked-inÕ patients might constitute a form 
of minimal consciousness (Qiu, 2007).  Finally, there is an active debate as to whether 
animals with smaller brains than ours, such as fish, might be sentient in a significant 
way, for instance, that they may experience pain (see, e.g. Seth (2016)).   These 
developments suggest that consciousness could be possible in an artificial agent without 
having to match the size or complexity of an intact human brain. Dennett (1994) has 
argued that Òcrude, cheesy, second-rate, artificial consciousnessÓ (p. 137) could be 
possible in robots
5
, and Bryson (2009) has proposed that todayÕs robots might already 
have some simple forms of consciousness that meet some commonly proposed criteria
6
.   
None of this is to claim that we are in quadrant III yet, but given the risks, ethicists 
should be pressing us as to how we would know if we were. 
One of the consequences of the view of robots as Òjust toolsÓ is the implicit dismissal of 
the possibility of strong AIÑthat future robots could have human-level, or beyond 
human-level general intelligence.  A quadrant III/IV issue, recently discussed by noted 
scientists and innovators such as Stephen Hawking, Elon Musk, and Bill Gates, to name 
a few, and analysed in-depth by Bostrom (2014), is that an AI ÔsingularityÕ could 
reverse the master-slave relationship between humans and robots.  The conviction that 
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 Indeed, Dennett (1994) specifically considers, and dismisses, the proposal that robots cannot 
have significant psychological properties such as consciousness simply because they are 
artefacts (contradicting Principle 4). 
6
 In subsequent papers Bryson has argued that consciousness per se may not qualify robots as 
moral patients and that we should avoid building robots that have psychological capacities, 
or other properties, that would qualify them as such (Bryson, 2010, 2012).  This view, and 
the active philosophical and scientific debates it relates to, speaks to some of the ethical 
questions raised in quadrants III and IV. 
robots/AIs are Òjust toolsÓ may keep us from recognising the early signs of such a self-
bootstrapping super-AI.   An ethical approach would surely encourage more vigilance.   
A more positive quadrant IV stance on the AI singularity debate is the perspective of the 
Ôglobal brainÕ, proposed by Heylighen (2002) and others, that humans and advanced AIs 
could co-exist to our mutual benefit.  This reminds us that that ethics must be about 
analysing the potential benefits as well as the risks. 
Although quadrant III/IV scenarios may seem far-fetched or at least distant, such 
concerns have captured the public imagination and have prompted significant calls for 
debate (e.g. Future of Life Institute (2015)).  In my own experience of talking to 
members of the public, and of the media, these are often the topics about which there is 
the greatest interest and concern.  The attempt to create a rhetorical barricade against 
these issues by insisting that robots are just tools may do little to calm the voices and 
could come across as hegemonic and condescending.  Whilst approaches to these 
longer-term ethical challenges are necessarily speculative, a starting point is to 
acknowledge that there are concerns here that are worthy of further attention. 
A more candid approach may be to recognise that, whilst most robots are currently little 
more than tools, we are entering an era where there will be new kinds of entities that 
combine some of the properties of machines and tools with psychological capacities that 
we had previously thought were reserved for complex biological organisms such as 
humans.  Following Kang (2011), the ontological status of robots might be best 
described as liminalÑneither living in quite in the same way as biological organisms, 
nor simply mechanical as with a traditional machine.  The liminality of robots makes 
them both fascinating and inherently frightening, and a lightning rod for our wider fears 
about the dehumanising effects of technology (Szollosy, 2016).  
The Association of Manhattan Scientists  wrote in 1945 of their feeling of collective 
responsibility for their role in developing a technology with Òpotential for great harm or 
great goodÓ (atomic energy) and of their Òspecial awarenessÓ that it might lead to the 
Òadvance of our civilization or its utter destructionÓ. In promoting the capability of 
robotics and AI towards a largely unknown end, our generation of researchers also have 
a special responsibility to understand and be outspoken about what the future of robotics 
might bring and its potential benefits and threats.  
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